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Abstract: In Functional Discourse Grammar, both Ascription and Reference are char-
acterized as actional processes and are captured at the Interpersonal Level of linguistic 
description. Additionally, the temporal sequencing of Discourse Acts seems relevant to 
establishing dependency relations among them. However, the remainder of the levels of 
representation in the theory contain static descriptions of linguistic structures and not of 
processes. In this paper, I will argue that this is the result of an inherent contradiction 
between FDG’s characterization as a static grammar and the dynamicity of verbal inter-
action, which is best solved if the theory commits itself to the procedural nature of the 
Interpersonal Level. In order to do so, the different categories that have been identified 
in the literature on the cognitive status of referents should find relevance in the gram-
mar. Elaborating upon García Velasco (2014), I will show that the temporal dimension 
of the text creating activity and referent accessibility, are relevant for a full account of 
constituent preposing in Spanish.
Keywords: Functional Discourse Grammar; reference; activation; preposing.
Resum: En gramàtica funcional discursiva (FDG, en les sigles en anglès), tant l’ads-
cripció com la referència són qualificades com a processos accionals i es localitzen en el 
nivell interpersonal de la descripció lingüística. D’altra banda, la seqüenciació temporal 
dels actes discursius sembla rellevant a l’hora d’establir-hi relacions de dependència. 
Tanmateix, els altres nivells de representació d’aquesta teoria inclouen descripcions 
estàtiques de les estructures lingüístiques i no de processos. En aquest article, mostra-
rem que això és el resultat d’una contradicció inherent entre la consideració de la FDG 
com una gramàtica estàtica i la dinamicitat de la interacció verbal, contradicció que es 
resol si la teoria atribueix una naturalesa procedimental al nivell interpersonal. Per po-
der-ho fer, les diferents categories identificades en la bibliografia sobre l’estat cognitiu 
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dels referents han de tenir un lloc destacat en la gramàtica. A partir de García Velasco 
(2014), mostrarem que la dimensió temporal del text, en què s’originen l’activitat i 
l’accessibilitat del referent, és rellevant per a una proposta global de l’anteposició de 
constituents en espanyol.  
Paraules clau: gramàtica funcional discursiva; referència; activació; anteposició.
Cognitive status and referential acts... 157
1. Introduction: FDG and verbal interaction1
Functional Discourse Grammar (henceforth FDG) is presented in Hen-
geveld & Mackenzie (2008) as a typologically-based theory of lan-
guage structure which is organized into four parallel linguistic levels. 
Each one of those levels corresponds to the main areas of grammatical 
analysis as indicated in (1):
(1)  Pragmatics → Interpersonal Level
  Semantics → Representational Level
  Morphosyntax → Morphosyntactic Level
  Phonology → Phonological Level
One of the main properties of this architecture of grammar is that 
each level is autonomous and self-contained in the sense that each one 
deals with its own type of linguistic information and is not sensitive to 
the workings and internal rules of the rest. Although they can be acti-
vated in parallel, the levels do not feed one another as in derivational 
theories, but rather find themselves in a relation of correspondence: one 
unit in each level typically corresponds to another unit at the rest of the 
levels of analysis, although the existence of mismatches among them is 
acknowledged and even assumed to be expected.
FDG thus intends to capture and represent the grammatical informa-
tion which is encoded in linguistic expressions. In that sense, it is not 
a model of language use, understood as the human ability to construct 
and interpret linguistic expressions, but a structural grammar based on 
functional principles. At the same time, however, FDG is presented as 
the grammar component of a wider theory of verbal interaction which 
includes a number of additional components assumed to be relevant 
in a full account of inter-human communication. The following gen-
eral diagram illustrates that the Grammar Component, FDG proper, is 
flanked by three additional components, the Conceptual Component, 
the Contextual Component and the Output Component (Hengeveld & 
Mackenzie, 2008: 13).
1 Thanks are due to Nuria Alturo, Francis Cornish and two anonymous reviewers for 
helpful comments. All remaining errors are my sole responsibility.
Daniel García Velasco158
Figure 1. General layout of Functional Discourse Grammar
The rectangles in the figure indicate the different levels of rep-
resentation which were mentioned earlier. These are produced by the 
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erations of formulation and encoding within the grammar component. 
Formulation is the process by means of which pragmatic and semantic 
representations are produced, whereas encoding is the process by which 
morphosyntactic and phonological structural representations are creat-
ed. The boxes on the left of the figure contain the primitives which are 
employed by the different operations.
As also mentioned earlier, the Grammar Component is flanked by 
three additional components. The Contextual Component represents 
the speech situation and includes both linguistic and non-linguistic 
perceptual information or, in current terms, discoursal and situational 
information (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2014). The Conceptual Compo-
nent is responsible for the creation of a communicative intention which 
will be translated through the process of Formulation into the relevant 
representations at the Interpersonal and Representational Levels. Final-
ly, the Output Component is responsible for the actual execution of a 
linguistic expression through the operation of articulation. Note that 
this articulation may be of different kinds (written, signed or spoken), 
depending on the medium of expression chosen.
One can detect an initial and inherent tension between FDG’s static 
approach to grammar and the necessary dynamism of language use and 
verbal interaction. This has posed a number of problems in the devel-
opment of the model. First, some scholars initially saw FDG as a pro-
duction model (see the contributions in Mackenzie & Gómez González, 
2004). This is only understandable, since FDG gained inspiration in 
Levelt’s (1989) psycholinguistic model of the speaker and because the 
theory also holds that the grammar is implemented dynamically. The 
theory’s proponents, however, have made it clear that FDG should not 
be seen as a production model, and that its dynamic implementation 
should be seen as a reflection of the sequence of steps taken by the ana-
lyst in order to “clarify the logic of the relations among the layers, lev-
els and components” (Mackenzie, 2014: 251). This, in Hengeveld and 
Mackenzie’s view, should be enough to meet the standard of psycho-
logical or cognitive adequacy which was proposed by Dik (1989: 13).
The second problem is of a more practical or analytical nature. It 
has been argued that some linguistic processes cannot be fully under-
stood under the static conception of the grammar proposed in FDG. For 
example, Keizer (2014) notes that a proper understanding of the con-
ditions governing the active/passive alternation in English demand a 
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close interaction between the Contextual Component and the grammar. 
Similarly, García Velasco (2014) observes the relevance of the notion of 
activation for an account of subject raising in English, and authors like 
Connolly (2007) and Cornish (2009) have argued for a closer interac-
tion between context and grammar than is assumed in FDG.
In this contribution I will pursue this line of inquiry and suggest that 
certain grammatical processes can only be fully understood if reference 
is made to the wider theory of verbal interaction of which FDG is the 
grammatical component. In particular, I will show that the activation 
status of referents is relevant to understanding the properties of con-
stituent preposing in Spanish. The paper is organised as follows. In the 
next section I will lay out the main aspects of the Interpersonal Level 
in FDG that will be relevant in the ensuing discussion. Section 3 will 
be devoted to introducing aspects of the cognitive accessibility of ref-
erents. In section 4 the basic properties of preposed Topics and Foci 
in Spanish will be presented. Finally, in section 5, I will present my 
conclusions.
2. The Interpersonal Level in FDG
The Interpersonal Level (IL) is defined by Hengeveld & Mackenzie 
(2008: 46) as the “level that deals with all the formal aspects of a lin-
guistic unit that reflect its role in the interaction between the Speaker and 
the Addressee”. In consonance with FDG’s general strategy, only those 
communicative choices that find systematic reflection in the grammar 
are represented at this level. Consider the following exchange:
(2) (Father to son)
 Will you answer me now?
On the basis of the social relations among the two participants, it 
might be reasonable to interpret the utterance in (2) as an order rather 
than as a question. However, the expression is formally an interrogative 
structure with the properties typically associated therewith (i.e. auxil-
iary inversion or rising intonation). The fact that this expression can be 
felicitously used as a command is something that must be explained 
with reference to the Contextual Component and Pragmatic Theory 
(e.g. Grice 1975), but which will not lead to a reinterpretation of that 
structure as presenting an imperative illocution.
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2.1. Acts and subacts
The central unit of analysis in FDG is the Discourse Act, which is de-
fined as “the smallest identifiable units of communicative behaviour” 
(Kroon, 1997: 20). It is important to stress that Discourse Acts do 
not correspond to a particular structural unit, as fully communicative 
utterances may consist of fragments of different sorts or incomplete 
sentences. Discourse Acts contain Referential and Ascriptive Subacts. 
FDG characterizes ascription and reference as actional processes. By 
carrying out a number of Subacts of Ascription and Reference speak-
ers are said to evoke a Communicated Content for their addressee to 
reconstruct in the interpretive process (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008: 
107). Subacts of reference serve to evoke an entity, whereas subacts of 
ascription are employed to evoke properties.
This actional view of the IL and reference and ascription is, howev-
er, somehow exceptional within the general characterization of FDG as 
a pattern model. Note that the remainder of the levels of representation 
in the theory (the Representational Level, the Morphosyntactic Lev-
el and the Phonological Level) contain static descriptions of linguistic 
patterns and units, and not of linguistic actions. Additionally, the IL is 
sensitive to the chronological organization of the communicative pro-
cess. Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 47) note that “at the layers of the 
Move and the Discourse Act the hierarchy crucially also represents the 
sequence of time course of the actions, which is essential to the real-
ization of the Speaker’s strategy”. In the other levels, and also within 
Discourse Acts at the IL, it is only hierarchical and scope relations that 
are relevant among the various units of analysis. This difference is par-
ticularly relevant, for if the ordering of Acts at the IL is dependent upon 
the speaker’s communicative strategy, it would seem there is no reason 
why other strategic decisions that are taken at the Conceptual Compo-
nent may not be reflected in the grammar. In particular, I am referring 
to the cognitive status of referents, whose degree of saliency or prom-
inence is related to the chronological unfolding of the interaction and 
is crucial to an understanding of the assignment of pragmatic functions 
and the analysis of information structure in FDG2. 
2 An anonymous reviewer has pointed out to me that if the actional nature of the IL is 
taken as an anomaly, a full commitment to its procedural nature would serve to accen-
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2.2. Information structure in FDG
Subacts of Ascription and Reference may carry Pragmatic Functions, 
which in FDG are said to pertain to the following three dimensions:
(3) Focus (vs. background)
 Topic (vs. comment)
 Contrast (vs. overlap)
It is usually the first of these dimensions (i.e. Focus, Topic and Con-
trast) which finds grammatical manifestation in languages. It is also 
relevant to note that these dimensions are not complementary, so that a 
given subact may carry, for example, both Topic and Focus function, as 
in the following presentative statement:
(4) There is [a new boy in town]TOPFOC
The assignment of Focus pragmatic function reflects the “Speaker’s 
strategic selection of new information” and the function “is assigned 
only in those cases in which this is linguistically relevant” (Hengeveld 
& Mackenzie, 2008: 89). Thus, in the following Thetic sentence the 
whole expression would receive Focus function, which correlates with 
specific prosodic properties: 
(5) [A train arrived]FOC
Topic function, in turn, is assigned to those constituents which sig-
nal how the “Communicated Content relates to the gradually construct-
ed record in the Contextual Component” (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 
2008: 92). Thus, the example in (4) not only introduces new focal in-
formation, but also a referent which is likely to be the subject matter 
of the subsequent discourse. Note additionally that FDG establishes a 
relevant difference between Topic and Orientation function. The former 
is assigned within a Discourse Act, but the latter is assigned to a Dis-
tuate that difference with the rest of levels. This is obviously true, but I do not see the 
actional nature of the IL as a problem, but as a natural consequence of its intermediate 
position between context, cognition and grammar, which makes it less amenable to 
being treated as a purely structural level.
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course Act which serves a subsidiary function to a second one. In the 
literature these are usually called left-detached or hanging topics and 
are typically intonationally set off from the rest of the utterance, as in 
the following Spanish example:
(6) Juan[OR],  no sé  nada de él
 Juan not know.1SG nothing of him
 ‘John, I don’t know anything about him’
Finally, Contrast function “signals the Speaker’s desire to bring out 
the particular differences between two or more Communicated Con-
tents or between a Communicated Content and contextually available 
information” (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008: 96). Although contrast 
is usually subsumed under Focus, Hengeveld and Mackenzie argue that 
it is an independent function as evidenced by the fact that it can be 
combined with the Topic and Focus functions. Thus, in the following 
sentence:
(7) It was the zoo that they went to, not the museum
Focus is combined with Contrast by means of a cleft-sentence.
Now, it would seem natural to expect that the assignment of Topic, 
Focus and Contrast functions is governed by properties as described in 
the Contextual and Conceptual components. The way in which the re-
lation between context and grammar is understood in FDG is explained 
in Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2014). In that contribution, the authors 
take a minimalistic approach to the type and amount of information that 
can be present in the Contextual Component. This information may be 
of two basic types: Situational and Discoursal. Discoursal information 
is relevant for processes of anaphoric and cataphoric reference, which 
entails that the Contextual Component should store information on the 
units that have been introduced in the discourse (or create an address 
for those that should be introduced later in the case of cataphoric pro-
cesses). The authors argue that this sets “a clear basis for distinguish-
ing between Given information (stored in the Contextual Component) 
and New information (which enters the system in the Grammatical 
Component)” (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2014: 207). Additionally, the 
Contextual Component stores situational information which pertains to 
the physical setting in which the interaction takes place and the speech 
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situation. This may also be relevant for pragmatic function assignment, 
as the authors indicate (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2014: 210):
The perceivability of an entity in the physical world at the Representa-
tional Stratum within the Contextual Component may, for instance, lead 
to the selection of this entity as the Topic of a Discourse Act at the In-
terpersonal Level within the Grammatical Component.
However, in line with the structural approach to grammar that FDG 
endorses, the theory has concentrated on the formal impact of prag-
matic functions on the grammar of languages, but not on the cognitive 
processes that lead to their assignment to particular subacts, in spite 
of the recognition of its relevance in the quotations above. The reason 
may well be that these cognitive statuses lead on most occasions to 
probabilistic choices only. The FDG approach to the relation between 
context and grammar thus reflects the inherent tension between the dy-
namicity of language interaction and the static approach to grammar 
that was mentioned earlier. On the one hand, Hengeveld and Mackenzie 
assume that aspects of the context may be relevant in the assignment of 
pragmatic functions, but FDG basically pays attention to how these are 
encoded in languages and what frames are relevant for a typologically 
adequate description of information structure in languages. 
As mentioned earlier, however, it has been claimed that the analysis 
of a number of grammatical processes can only be fully satisfactory if 
reference is made to additional properties of the Contextual Compo-
nent. Additionally, the distinctive properties of the IL with respect to the 
rest of levels in FDG seem to suggest that rather than a strict structural 
representation of pragmatic properties, the IL also encodes procedural 
information deriving from the strategic communicative choices made 
by speakers before formulation. If that is the case, there is no reason 
why FDG could not pay more attention to the accessibility of referents 
as a way to understanding the pragmatic structuring of linguistic ex-
pressions. I turn to this issue in the following section.
3. The cognitive status of referents
The dynamicity of language use implies that the assignment of prag-
matic functions is necessarily dependent upon the speech participant’s 
interpretation of the accessibility of referents as the discourse develops. 
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Consequently, a well-established research tradition has concentrated on 
the relation between the cognitive status of referents and its impact on 
grammatical and syntactic form (see among others Chafe, 1994; Gun-
del et al., 1993; Lambrecht, 1994; Prince, 1981).
Gundel & Fretheim (2002) establish a twofold distinction in the 
study of information structure: referential givenness and relational 
givenness. The first one “involves a relation between a linguistic ex-
pression and a corresponding non-linguistic entity in the speaker/hear-
er’s mind, the discourse (model), or some real or possible world” (2002: 
3). Relational givenness “involves a partition of the semantic-conceptu-
al representation of a sentence into two complementary parts…”. Gun-
del & Fretheim (2002: 5) note that the two dimensions are ‘logically 
independent’; whereas the latter is a property of linguistic representa-
tions, the former is not specifically linguistic.
In a similar vein, I argued in García Velasco (2013; 2014) that prag-
matic functions in the F(D)G tradition have been defined under a prom-
inence / aboutness interpretation, and that a time / givenness dimension 
should be introduced which would relate to the pragmatic structuring of 
discourse and to a dynamic temporal articulation as opposed to the stat-
ic form-oriented nature of aboutness. In that work, I argued that a given 
referent should be characterized as one which is ‘active at this point 
in the conversation’ (Chafe, 1994: 72), and proposed that the second 
time dimension should contain two sub-dimensions as indicated in (8), 
which includes all pragmatic functions now relevant for FDG3:
(8) Time dimension: givenness
  Active (vs. inactive)
  Shared (vs. unshared)
 Prominence dimension: aboutness
  Focus (vs. background)
  Topic (vs. comment)
  Contrast (vs. overlap)
FDG has concentrated on the prominence dimension only, for the 
reasons explained earlier. As a structural grammar, the model pays 
3 See García Velasco (2014) for the relevance of the shared vs. unshared dimension.
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attention to those aspects of the communicative situation that have a 
formal impact on the grammar of languages.
However, this does not mean that all other categories identified in 
the study of the cognitive status of referents and the time dimension 
do not have relevance for FDG. Consider the case of identifiability, a 
notion which is intimately related to that of activation. Identifiability 
is given operator status in FDG. Subacts of reference are marked as 
{+id} if the speaker assumes that the intended referent is identifiable 
for his/her addressee. As a consequence, FDG treats identifiability as a 
linguistically-relevant notion, whereas the related notion of activation 
is considered non-linguistic and is therefore not captured in the gram-
mar per se. This strategy runs counter to most approaches to identifia-
bility and activation. For example, Gundel & Hedberg (2016: 35) (see 
also Gundel Hedberg & Zacharski, 1993) note that nominal expressions 
“encode two kinds of information: (1) procedural information about 
how to mentally access a representation of the intended referent/inter-
pretation (…); and (2) conceptual / descriptive information about the 
referent / interpretation.” FDG includes descriptive information about 
referents at the Representational Level, but as argued earlier, procedural 
information of the kind envisaged by Gundel & Hedberg (2016) is only 
partly included in the IL.
It should be noted, however, that the relative prominence of referents 
is treated by Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2014) as an objective property 
of the contextual component. In that work, they introduce the notion of 
contextual saliency which is characterized as follows (2014: 210):
Contextual saliency is an observable feature of texts and situations and 
relies on the actual mention of an entity in a discourse or its actual per-
ception in the situation in which a text is produced. Contextual saliency 
is therefore necessarily shared between interlocutors. 
In their view this contrasts with the notion of activation, which they 
see as “highly individual” (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2014: 210-211). 
Therefore, they conclude that “Activation state as a notion is therefore 
relevant within the Conceptual Component”. 
As I argued in García Velasco (2014), however, (see also Connolly, 
2007), it is difficult to conceive of the Contextual Component as a purely 
objective entity. There is no objective context, as it is always mediated 
by the way it is perceived or understood by speakers. The communica-
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tive choices made by the speech participants rely on their interpretation 
of the Contextual Component through the Conceptual Component. In 
other words, speakers interpret the properties of the situation and base 
their communicative strategy on that interpretation. In that sense, it is 
true that activation is relevant in the Conceptual Component, and so is 
every communicative intention, as all of them are informed by the con-
text. This leads, as mentioned earlier, to the sequencing of acts at the IL, 
to actions of ascription and reference, to the assignment of {+id} status 
to referents and Topic or Focus function to a given subact. The picture 
which thus emerges is one in which the IL encodes procedural informa-
tion rather than pure grammatical choices offered by the system. The 
introduction of a time dimension is thus natural under an interpretation 
of the IL as a level in which contextually informed linguistic actions 
are encoded. 
In previous work of mine (García Velasco, 2008; 2013) I have 
shown that the pragmatic functions in the time dimension are relevant 
for a proper understanding of phenomena such as syntactic extraction 
from complex noun phrases and subject raising. In the following sec-
tion I will additionally show that the combination of the time and prom-
inence dimensions with their respective pragmatic functions offers the 
necessary tools for an adequate treatment of as yet poorly understood 
properties of preposing in the Spanish language.
4. Pragmatic preposing in Spanish
Like many other languages, Spanish makes use of clause-initial position 
to place constituents with special pragmatic status4. However, the com-
municative burden of preposed constituents may be of different types, 
and this correlates with different syntactic and phonological properties. 
Bosque & Gutiérrez-Rexach (2009: 354) distinguish two types of 
topics in Spanish: “hanging topics” as in (9a), which serve to introduce 
a new topic in discourse, and which correspond to the Orientation func-
tion in FDG (cf. 6 above), and “left-detached” topics as in (9b), which 
provide more emphasis on an already active topic:
4 For comprehensive treatments of Spanish syntax see Bosque & Demonte (1999) and 
RAE & ASALE (2009).
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(9) a. Luisa, me parece     a  mí que no se 
  Lousie,  me seem.3sg to me that not refl
  entera     mucho    de lo que  está pasando
  realize.3sg much     of the_what be.3sg happening
  ‘Louise, it seems to me that she does not realize of what’s going on’
 b. Las lentejas, no las soporto.
  The lentils not them bear.1sg
  ‘Lentils, I can’t stand them’
Left-detached topics may sometimes be found without a significant 
intonation break, but they typically establish a relation with a co-refer-
ential non-predicative visible or null pronoun in the clause. Indeed, un-
like (9a), (9b) can be easily read without a full intonation break after the 
displaced noun phrase, which, presumably, would get Topic function 
in a FDG analysis. This means that, unlike (9a), which contains two 
Discourse Acts, (9b) can be analysed as containing just one Discourse 
Act. The simplified analysis for the ILs in both (9a) and (9b) are given 
in (10a) and (10b) respectively:
(10) a. (MI: [(AI: -Luisa- (AI))OR
    (AJ: -me parece a mi que...- (AJ))] (MI))
 b. (MI: [(AI: -(las lentejas)TOP no las soporto- (AI))] (MI))
Consider now the following examples (RAE & ASALE 2009: 
2989)5:
(11) a. El  departamento, yo lo  vendería
  The department I it would_sell
  ‘The department, I would sell it’
 b. El  departamento vendería  yo
  The department would_sell I
 ‘I would sell the department’
5 RAE: Real Academia Española; ASALE: Asociación de Academias de la Lengua Es-
pañola.
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In example (11a) the sequence el departamento is clearly a left-de-
tached topic (cf. 9b). It is intonationally set off from the rest of the 
sentence, which also contains a pronominal element lo referring back 
to the detached topic. Note additionally that the pronominal subject 
yo occupies preverbal position. In (11b), which is truth-conditionally 
equivalent to (11a), the sequence el departamento now functions as a 
focal unit and is phonologically integrated in the clause, which does not 
(and cannot) present a coreferential pronominal element as in (10a). 
Additionally, the subject of the sentence yo is necessarily postposed. 
As noted by RAE & ASALE (2009: 2989) preposed foci in Spanish are 
always displaced from intra-clausal positions. In FDG, this expression 
would be analysed as realizing just one Discourse Act, with the noun 
phrase el departamento bearing, presumably, Focus function:
(12) (MI: [(AI: -(el departamento)FOC vendería yo- (AI))] (MI))
In other words, at the IL, the analysis of preposed topical and focal 
constituents in Spanish seems to differ only in the pragmatic function 
assigned to the displaced units, with the concurrent morphosyntactic 
and phonological differences being captured at the relevant levels. It 
follows that in those cases in which those properties do not conclu-
sively distinguish one construction from the other, it may be difficult to 
determine the pragmatic function of the displaced unit. The difficulty 
in distinguishing preposed topics and foci is somehow tacitly acknowl-
edged in FDG. Thus, Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 92) argue that in 
the following Dutch example, demonstrative dat bears Topic function 
and its antecedent is located in the Contextual Component.
(13) Dat heb ik nooit gezegd
 That have I never said
 ‘I never said that’
However, they follow Mackenzie & Keizer (1991) in claiming that 
English has no Topic function “since no formal features exist in the 
language which justify the assumption of Topic function” (see Cornish 
2004 for relevant discussion). In the following example, then, clause in-
itial that is necessarily accented and therefore expresses Contrast func-
tion (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008: 93):
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(14) That I never said
Now, if clause-initial position may be used for the placement of both 
topical and focal or contrastive units it would seem natural to find lan-
guages which exploit both possibilities. This is precisely what we find 
in Spanish, a language in which clause-initial position may be used for 
the assignment of both Topic and Focus function as shown earlier.
Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 95) themselves illustrate the assign-
ment of Topic function to ascriptive subacts with the following Spanish 
example: 
(15) Llover no llueve
 Rain not rain.3sg
 ‘Raining, it does not rain’
But, of course, there are plenty of examples of Topic function as-
signment to referential acts: 
(16) a. El dinero sobraba
  The money left_over.3sg
  ‘There was too much money’
 b. La televisión no la veo
  The  TV  not it see.1sg
  ‘I don’t watch the TV’
Initially, it would seem that it is not difficult to distinguish the Topic/
Orientation function from preposed foci in Spanish. As indicated ear-
lier (see RAE & ASALE, 2009: 2974), Orientation and left-detached 
topics usually (but not always) require the presence of a coreferential 
element in the clause and are intentionally set off from the rest of the 
sentence. Preposed foci, additionally, are usually accented (as in Eng-
lish) and are not followed by an intonation break. However, the exist-
ence of preposed topical constituents with no clear intonation break 
(examples 15 and 16) and no pronominal copy (examples 15 and 16a), 
which are indeed treated in FDG as cases of Topic function assignment, 
might seem problematic: given that clause-initial position can be used 
for both focal and topical units, the interpretation of the displaced unit 
may be difficult or ambiguous at times. Thus, in the following example 
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taken from RAE & ASALE (2009: 2974) the preposed prepositional 
phrase de la próxima función is compatible with both a focal and topical 
interpretation:
(17) De    la próxima función depende           nuestra supervivencia
 Of     the next show depend.3sg     our survival
 ‘Our survival depends on the next show’
In other cases, the presence or absence of an intonation break is the 
only determining factor for one interpretation or the other, as in the fol-
lowing example (RAE & ASALE, 2009: 2975): 
(18) En   esta casa  (,) viví yo diez años
 In    this house  lived I ten years
 ‘I lived in this house ten years’
Consequently, the existence of ambiguous cases and the common 
properties of preposed Topics and Foci in Spanish pose the question of 
what makes them both acceptable in clause-initial position. Preposed 
focal constituents in Spanish may be of different structural types, in-
cluding prepositional or adverbial phrases, quantifiers or noun phrases. 
As for the latter, it is interesting to observe that many of the examples 
of preposed referential acts provided by RAE & ASALE contain ana-
phoric expressions (RAE & ASALE, 2009: 2987):
(19) a. Eso mismo pensaba hacer yo esta tarde
  That same thought do I this  evening
  ‘That I was thinking to do this evening’
b. Estas cosas tenía yo en la cabeza
 Those things had I in  the  head
 ‘Those things I had in my mind’
It is well-known that the use of demonstratives correlates with a rel-
evant degree of activation status of their referents (Gundel et al., 1993; 
Cornish, this issue). In particular, the examples in (19) are only felic-
itous if the antecedent has been introduced in the immediate previous 
discourse or is perceivable in the current setting. In other words, many 
of these preposed foci serve a discourse-deictic function (strict-anadeix-
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is in Cornish’s terms) and contribute to discourse cohesion by keeping 
a referent active. This means that clause-initial position seems a natural 
place for those constituents with a relevant activation state. This state 
may be compatible with a focal or topical interpretation, leading to the 
assignment of one or the other function and the manifestation of the 
corresponding grammatical properties. Interestingly, left-detached top-
ics seem to serve the same general strategy of keeping a referent active, 
as indicated earlier.
However, FDG as currently conceived offers no way of explain-
ing both the differences and similarities in information status between 
preposed topics and foci with reference to the activation state of the 
displaced units. The introduction of Activation in the time dimension 
as proposed earlier can easily solve this problem if both focal and top-
ical units may optionally get an Active pragmatic function in the rel-
evant cases. According to Lambrecht (1994: 115-116), the activation 
states of referents should be seen as preconditions for topic and focus 
function. Thus, the same activation state may be reflected in topic or 
focal status. This is illustrated with the following contrast in Italian and 
French (emphasis as indicated in original):
(20) a. Io pago / MoI je paye.
  ‘I’ll pay.’
 b. Pago Io / C’est MoI qui paye.
  ‘I’ll pay.’
The pronominal expressions in (20) have the same activation state 
in both examples, but receive focus function only in (20b). This expres-
sion is likely to be uttered in a context in which it is presupposed that 
someone has to pay something and two or more people intend to do so. 
Therefore, the sentences differ only in the pragmatic function of the 
pronominal expressions but their referents are necessarily active since 
they are speech participants themselves.
Thus ambiguous cases such as (17) and (18) above may be explained 
on the basis of the model proposed. The ambiguity arises because the 
displaced unit is active in both cases, and serves a similar discourse 
function, in spite of their differences in informative value. But this anal-
ysis is only possible if Activation is included in the grammar as an ad-
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ditional pragmatic function along the time dimension, which relates to 
the dynamic construction of discourse.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, I have shown that the Interpersonal Level in FDG is some-
how exceptional in the theory’s architecture in that it is the only one 
that encodes linguistic actions and is sensitive to the chronological se-
quence of the communicative choices that speakers deploy. This is un-
derstandable as this level occupies an intermediate position between the 
Conceptual Component (which in my view includes the speakers’ men-
tal representation of the Contextual Component) and linguistic meaning 
and form. It should also be noted that the procedural flavour of the 
Interpersonal Level in FDG was already noticed in the first years of the 
model (see Mackenzie, 2004). Elaborating upon García Velasco (2014), 
I have also shown that the temporal dimension and the cognitive status 
of referents, in particular, their degree of activation status, is relevant in 
a full account of constituent preposing in Spanish. 
Obviously, not all preposed Foci in this language contain anaphor-
ic expressions as in the examples in (13). In this contribution I have 
only concentrated on referential units, so that an examination of the 
properties of different types of constituents in clause-initial position is 
an interesting exercise for future research. In all, it has become evi-
dent that in order to understand the relevance of clause-initial position 
in Spanish, it is necessary to go beyond the limits of the grammatical 
properties manifested in individual sentences and pay attention to the 
role and status of referents in larger stretches of discourse.
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